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Many countries have debated 
the merits of inflation targeting, and 
some have adopted inflation targeting 
as a national policy. In an inflation-
targeting framework, a central bank 
announces quantitative targets for 
inflation and specifies that controlling 
inflation is a long-run goal of monetary 
policy. another common feature is a 
1 see the book by bernanke and co-authors for a 
formal description of inflation targeting.
A Review of Inflation Targeting in
Developed Countries
n the united states, inflation targeting 
has many advocates, but many others are 
skeptical about adopting such a policy. Given 
this debate and inflation targeting’s growing 
adoption around the world, now is a good time to review 
the economic performance of some inflation-targeting 
countries. In this article, Mike Dotsey examines five 
countries that have been targeting inflation for at least 
10 years and whose inflation rates, though fairly well 
contained before inflation targeting, were nonetheless 
considered too high by policymakers. For purposes of 
comparison, he also looks at the economic performance of 
six noninflation-targeting countries. 
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specific policy for bringing inflation 
back to target in circumstances where 
the target has been missed. also, infla-
tion-targeting central banks have often 
adopted a more transparent policy that 
entails fairly detailed communications 
with the public.1 
new Zealand first instituted this 
monetary policy framework in early 
1990. since that time, 22 countries 
have formally adopted inflation target-
ing, and no country that has adopted 
it has abandoned it. although infla-
tion targeting’s contribution to overall 
economic performance is still being 
debated, the general view is that it has 
had beneficial effects. Inflation and its 
volatility have generally declined in 
inflation-targeting countries and out-
put growth has increased. at the same 
time, it appears that the volatility of 
output has decreased.  
Inflation targeting has many ad-
vocates in the united states. Those 
in favor base their argument on the 
economic benefits that ensue from low 
and stable inflation, the possibility that 
inflation targeting would enhance the 
FoMC’s credibility, and the increased 
flexibility that could come from in-
creased credibility.2
others, however, are not quite as 
enthusiastic, and their reservations 
largely involve concerns over a lack of 
flexibility that might result from infla-
tion targeting, especially in situations 
where maintaining a tight rein on 
inflation could prove damaging to the 
economy. Critics also point out that 
u.s. monetary policy has performed 
quite well over the last 20 years with-
out any formal reliance on an inflation 
target and that it may be a bit too early 
to fully evaluate the relative perfor-
mance of inflation-targeting countries. 
Inflation targeting’s track record is 
rather short, and we may not yet have 
seen situations where adhering to an 
inflation target would be detrimental 
to economic performance. 
Given the status of the debate 
over inflation targeting, the recent 
interest in this topic in the united 
states, and its growing adoption by 
countries around the world, now seems 
2 For a representative viewpoint, see speeches by 
anthony santomero in Federal reserve bank 
of Philadelphia Business Review, Third Quarter 
2003 and Fourth Quarter 2004.  Business Review  Q3  2006   11 www.philadelphiafed.org
an opportune time to review the poli-
cies and economic performance of a 
number of inflation-targeting coun-
tries. To carry out this evaluation, I 
will examine a set of countries — new 
Zealand, Canada, australia, the 
united Kingdom, and sweden — that 
have been targeting inflation for at 
least 10 years and whose inflation 
rates were fairly well contained before 
they adopted inflation targeting. This 
choice helps avoid issues that arise if 
we choose countries that went from 
high inflation to low inflation after 
targeting, and the experience of the 
countries chosen is more relevant from 
the standpoint of the united states. 
For purposes of comparison, I will 
examine the economic performance 
of those five countries along with the 
performance of six noninflation-tar-
geting countries: the united states, 
Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and 
the netherlands. I will also summarize 
some recent empirical studies on infla-
tion targeting.
The view taken here is that infla-
tion targeting has been modestly ben-
eficial. Inflation has indeed declined 
in the five countries examined. Infla-
tion volatility has also declined and, 
perhaps just as important, so has the 
inertia in the inflation process itself. 
Furthermore, expectations of inflation 
seem to be more stable in the inflation-
targeting countries, lending credence 
to the assertion that inflation targeting 
enhances a central bank’s credibility. 
also, there seem to be no negative 
consequences for economic activity. 
output growth has tended to be stron-
ger and less volatile over the time that 
these countries have targeted inflation. 
Moreover, central bankers in these five 
countries have publicly expressed en-
thusiasm for the framework. 
KEY FEATURES OF INFLATION 
TARGETING
Inflation targeting establishes a 
numerical objective for inflation, and 
the actual target is stated as either 
a specific point target or a range. 
although the framework explicitly 
acknowledges that maintaining a low 
inflation rate is a primary policy ob-
jective, inflation need not be the sole 
objective of monetary policy. When 
inflation is not the central bank’s 
only concern, the other concerns 
are often stated in the central bank’s 
explicit mandate, or the central bank 
may communicate its concerns more 
informally to the public. Importantly, 
in an inflation-targeting framework, 
monetary policy is delegated to an in-
dependent central bank. 
by establishing numerical objec-
tives that are to be met over speci-
fied periods, an inflation-targeting 
framework embeds accountability. 
The issue of accountability has led to 
very open communication between 
inflation-targeting central banks and 
the public. This increased openness is 
called transparency. The combination 
of transparency and specific numerical 
objectives makes monitoring inflation 
targeting easier for the public. This 
openness also helps central banks es-
tablish credibility because it is easier to 
judge whether they are meeting their 
commitments.
adherence to the general frame-
work of inflation targeting requires the 
monetary authority to pay attention to 
a number of particular elements. one 
key element involves picking a par-
ticular measure of inflation. There are 
numerous measures of inflation, rang-
ing from the headline measure of the 
consumer price index (CPI) to various 
less volatile measures of inflation, 
which typically exclude the food and 
energy components of the headline 
measure. These less volatile measures 
are typically referred to as the core in-
flation measure of a price index. also, 
should the target be a point or a range, 
and over what period should inflation 
be measured? should monthly infla-
tion be targeted, or should it be some 
long-run average of inflation? In addi-
tion, if the target is a point target, the 
central bank must decide how much of 
a deviation from its target it is willing 
to tolerate. For example, should the 
implicit or explicit range be just a few 
percentage points or wider?
other equally important consid-
erations involve whether the central 
bank should have multiple goals, such 
as a target for output growth or the 
unemployment rate, and how a central 
bank can be held accountable for its 
actions. Communication and transpar-
ency become quite important in an 
inflation-targeting regime. but how 
transparent should the central bank 
be?
The various approaches of the 
five inflation-targeting countries ex-
amined in this article are summarized 
in Table 1. as we can see, approaches 
to inflation targeting vary.3 however, 
although there are a number of differ-
ences, there are some key commonali-
ties. Most have a point target but are 
content to let inflation vary within 
plus or minus 1 percent of the target. 
also, most central banks currently tar-
get an annual average of the headline 
CPI, but they also report the behavior 
3 excellent summaries of inflation targeting can 
be found in the book by edwin Truman and the 
book by bernanke and co-authors.
Importantly, in an inflation-targeting framework, 
monetary policy is delegated to an independent 
central bank.12   Q3  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
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Inflation-Targeting Framework of Five Countries
source: Pooled from various materials (see references).
of core measures. Many, but not all, re-
port a time path for bringing inflation 
back to target if the target is missed. 
Finally, all of the inflation-targeting 
central banks are quite transparent 
and issue frequent and detailed com-
munications concerning policy. The 
only major difference is with respect to 
independence. although all indepen-
dently set interest rates, only two out 
of the five have sole responsibility for 
setting the ultimate goals of policy.  Business Review  Q3  2006   13 www.philadelphiafed.org
Country
Pre-inflation Targeting (10 years prior to 
adopting target; for dates see Table 1)
Post-inflation Targeting - 2004
(for dates see Table 1)
inflation growth s.d. inflation s.d. growth inflation growth s.d. inflation s.d. growth
nZ 11.4 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.1 3.0 1.8 2.4
Canada 5.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.0 2.7 1.3 2.1
u.K. 5.5 2.5 3.0 1.9 2.5 2.9 0.8 0.7
australia 6.0 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 3.8 1.6 1.1
sweden 6.7 1.9 2.9 2.3 1.5 2.5 1.1 1.6
avg. IT 7.1 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.1 3.0 1.3 1.6
Inflation and Output Growth in Noninflation-Targeting Countries, Comparison
  1982-1992 1992-2004
u.s. 4.0 3.0 1.3 2.6 2.5 3.3 0.6 1.2
Japan 1.9 3.7 1.1 1.8 0.1 1.1 1.0 1.6
Germany 2.6 2.7 1.7 5.3 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.4
France 5.1 2.2 3.3 1.1 1.6 1.9 0.6 1.3
neth. 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 0.8 1.6
Italy 8.3 2.2 4.6 1.3 3.0 1.5 1.3 1.4
avg. nIT 4.1 2.7 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.0 1.4
TABLE 2
Inflation and Output Growth in Inflation-Targeting Countries,
Before and After*
* Inflation rates are annualized changes in the headline CPI and growth rates are annualized rates of growth in GDP.EXPERIENCE UNDER
INFLATION TARGETING
now let’s compare the experience 
of the five inflation-targeting countries 
with that of the six noninflation-tar-
geting countries. These six countries 
serve as a reference, preventing me 
from attributing various economic 
outcomes to inflation targeting when, 
in fact, these outcomes may be a result 
of global economic conditions. For 
example, output volatility declined in 
all 11 of the countries from 1992 to 
2004, the years in the latter half of my 
sample. attributing the entire decline 
in the inflation-targeting countries to 
inflation targeting would be erroneous. 
Inflation targeting should be viewed as 
helping to lower output volatility only 
if inflation-targeting countries experi-
ence a greater decline than noninfla-
tion-targeting countries.
First, let’s look at data on inflation 
and output growth for both the five 
inflation-targeting countries and the 
six noninflation-targeting countries. 
For the inflation-targeting sample, 
we’ll use data for the 10 years before 
the adoption of inflation targeting and 
from adoption to the end of 2004. For 
the noninflation-targeting countries, 
the first sample of data covers 1982 to 
1992, and the second sample covers 
1992 to 2004. This methodology allows 
a visual comparison of the data before 
adoption of inflation targeting and 
after. The data are shown in figures 1 
and 2 and summarized in Table 2.
The first thing to notice is that 
with the exception of Italy, the infla-
tion-targeting countries had higher 
inflation rates in the first part of the 
sample, while output growth was fairly 
comparable across the two groups. 
Therefore, it is evident that the u.s., 
Japan, Germany, and the netherlands 
had less incentive to adopt inflation 
targeting, since their inflation rates 
were already fairly low. In the second 
half of the sample, both sets of coun-
tries have similarly low rates of infla-
tion, and high inflation is not deemed 
to be a problem for any of the coun-
tries.4 Thus, it appears that inflation 
targeting is associated with a lowering 
of inflation for all five countries that 
adopted it but that central banks can 
also achieve low inflation without ex-
plicitly targeting inflation. 
however, to gauge the effective-
ness of inflation targeting, we want to 
examine the comparative differences 
in behavior of the two groups of coun-
tries over the two samples. some of the 
noninflation-targeting countries may 
have specific circumstances that al-
low them to more easily keep inflation 
low. For example, the noninflation-
targeting countries tend to be larger 
countries and may be more immune to 
the effects of changes in international 
prices. We do not want to conclude 
that inflation targeting is ineffective 
when two countries have similarly low 
inflation, one an inflation-targeting 
country and the other one not, since 
that outcome may occur because infla-
tion targeting was helpful in the coun-
try that adopted it but was less needed 
in the country that didn’t. To avoid 
this confusion, I concentrate on differ-
ences in inflation and output growth 
across the two groups of countries and 
across the two sample periods. Do-
ing so cancels out factors specific to 
a particular country that may affect 
the level of inflation because those 
country-specific factors are assumed to 
be the same across the two sample pe-
riods. by looking at differences across 
the two sample periods, we can remove 
that level effect.
In that regard, the graphs show 
that both sets of countries saw a reduc-
tion in inflation, but, on average, the 
reduction was greater for inflation-tar-
geting countries. In those countries, 
average annual inflation rates declined 
5 percentage points as opposed to 2.2 
percentage points for the noninfla-
tion-targeting countries. also, output 
growth increased by an average annual 
rate of 0.6 percentage point in the in-
flation-targeting countries but actually 
declined 0.6 percentage point in the 
noninflation-targeting countries. 
next, let’s look at the relative vari-
ability of inflation and output over the 
two sample periods (Figure 2). exclud-
ing Italy, the variability of inflation, as 
measured by the standard deviation of 
annualized growth rates in the head-
line CPI, is greater for the inflation-
targeting countries before the adoption 
of inflation targeting. after adoption, 
the average volatility of inflation fell 
a dramatic 1.6 percentage points for 
the inflation-targeting countries, but 
it also fell 1.4 percentage points for the 
noninflation-targeting countries. as in 
the case of the decline in the inflation 
rate, much of the decline in volatility 
in the noninflation-targeting countries 
occurred because France and Italy 
became part of the european Currency 
union and one of the requirements for 
joining the union was a low and stable 
inflation rate. Thus, there was insti-
tutional pressure for France and Italy 
4 Japan, on the other hand, suffered from defla-
tion and a very sluggish economy in the second 
half of the sample. It is possible that Japan 
would have benefited from inflation targeting 
because it would have forced the country to 
have a more expansionary monetary policy.
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Noninflation-targeting countries tend to be 
larger countries and may be more immune to 
the effects of changes in international prices.FIGURE 1
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Inflation-Targeting Countries Noninflation-Targeting Countries
Output
Inflation-Targeting Countries Noninflation-Targeting CountriesAverage Growth vs. Average Inflation
FIGURE 2
Inflation and Output
to reduce their inflation rates in the 
second half of the sample.5
output volatility also declined 
by nearly the same amount for both 
groups of countries, and both groups 
show a more favorable tradeoff be-
tween output and inflation volatility 
over the later sample (Figure 2). Just 
looking at the data in this way is in-
formative, but it has limitations. It 
doesn’t control for many features of 
the economic environment that affect 
inflation and output and that may be 
unrelated to inflation targeting. The 
sample size is still very small, making 
any definitive conclusion statistically 
difficult.6 
For example, countries may have 
experienced more favorable economic 
shocks after they adopted inflation 
targeting, and merely examining 
economic outcomes before and after 
adoption could overstate the benefits 
of inflation targeting.7 using a control 
group of countries helps avoid attribut-
ing all of the improvement in inflation 
and output performance to the infla-
tion-targeting framework, but it also 
brings its own set of interpretation 
problems. 
In particular, there are some 
important differences between the 
inflation-targeting countries and the 
control group. The inflation-targeting 
countries are small, open economies, 
whereas the control group contains 











0 1 2 3 4 5
Average percent change in GDP
Average percent change in CPI
Standard Deviations of Growth & Inflation
16   Q3  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org

















SD of percent GDP growth
5 one of the convergence criteria of the Maas-
tricht Treaty was for countries to have a rate of 
inflation that was less than a maximum of 1.5 
percent above the average rate in the three eu 
countries with the lowest inflation.
6 For example, more sophisticated statistical 
work analyzing whether inflation targeting re-
duces the variability of inflation is inconclusive.
7 an economic shock is a factor that causes 
unexpected changes in economic variables. 
shocks can be unfavorable, such as the devas-
tating economic effects of hurricanes, or favor-
able, such as an innovation in technology that 
increases productivity.  Business Review  Q3  2006   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
some economically large countries.8 
Thus, the inflation-targeting countries 
have a greater exposure to external 
economic disturbances. also, the 
control group may have adopted better 
monetary policy over the most recent 
period, perhaps implicitly target-
ing inflation, and by doing so would 
diminish the benefits attributable to 
inflation targeting.  It could also be the 
case that the countries that adopted 
inflation targeting just had relatively 
bad luck before adoption and now have 
experienced a more normal set of eco-
nomic shocks. If that were the case, we 
might incorrectly attribute the benefits 
of a change in luck to inflation target-
ing. It also doesn’t allow us to examine 
another important aspect of inflation 




To more sharply assess the poten-
tial benefits of inflation targeting, let’s 
review the economic literature regard-
ing the empirical effects associated 
with inflation targeting.9 In general, it 
appears that adopting inflation target-
ing has reduced the inflation rate and 
the persistence of inflation, has stabi-
lized long-run expectations of infla-
tion, and has not had any deleterious 
effects on output. however, inflation 
targeting has probably not had any sig-
nificant effect on inflation volatility.
The Inflation Rate. one of the 
primary reasons for moving to infla-
tion targeting is to reduce inflation. 
From Figure 1 and Table 2, it is clear 
that inflation did decline after the 
adoption of inflation targeting. but 
it also declined for countries that did 
not adopt inflation targeting. Thus, 
distinguishing between the experi-
ence of countries that target inflation 
and those that do not requires more 
sophisticated statistical techniques. 
The basic message from such exercises 
is mixed. a number of studies indicate 
that inflation targeting was successful 
in reducing inflation, but that con-
clusion is sensitive to how the study 
controlled for the fact that many infla-
tion-targeting countries had relatively 
high inflation before they introduced 
inflation targeting. It also depends on 
the countries in the particular study. 
an interesting but controversial 
study by Laurence ball and niamh 
sheridan attributes all the statistically 
significant lowering of inflation to the 
fact that inflation-targeting countries 
initially had higher inflation, and 
therefore, all one sees is a regression 
to the mean.10 however, other studies 
that included nonindustrialized coun-
tries have found significant benefits of 
inflation targeting in terms of lowering 
inflation in both industrialized and 
nonindustrialized countries.11 In his 
book, edwin Truman notes that in this 
wider set of countries, there is little 
correlation between past inflation and 
the adoption of inflation targeting. 
The problem from the standpoint of 
the united states is that the experi-
ence of many of these countries may 
not be very relevant for understanding 
how inflation targeting would affect 
the united states. Fortunately, other 
types of data allow for a better un-
derstanding of the effects of inflation 
targeting. 
Expected Inflation. one measure 
that appears to behave differently be-
tween industrialized inflation-targeting 
countries and industrialized noninfla-
tion-targeting countries is expected 
inflation. a primary motivation for 
adopting inflation targeting is to both 
reduce and stabilize expectations of 
inflation. If inflation targeting can ac-
complish this, then, in theory, it can 
reduce the tradeoff between lowering 
inflation and the loss of output. 
a large set of economic models 
imply that when individuals expect a 
higher inflation rate than the rate the 
central bank is targeting, employment 
falls because higher expectations of 
inflation lead to higher wage demands. 
When these expectations are unreal-
istically high, the higher wages cause 
firms to hire fewer workers and em-
ployment falls. Firms may also set pric-
es too high, thereby reducing the de-
mand for their products. both factors, 
which originate from erroneous views 
8 a country is said to have an open economy 
if it engages in significant trade with other 
countries.
9 The results are largely taken from these five 
papers: David Johnson; andrew Levin, Fabio 
natalucci, and Jeremy Piger; Laurence ball and 
niamh sheridan; refet Gurkaynak, andrew 
Levin, and eric swanson; and Marco Vega and 
Diego Winkelried; as well as evidence presented 
in the book by edwin Truman. These studies 
were chosen because they are some of the most 
recent and therefore have the longest data sets. 
They also do a relatively good job of controlling 
for the experience of noninflation-targeting 
countries. all of the studies include the five 
inflation-targeting countries highlighted above, 
but many include a wider control group and, 
occasionally, other, more recently industrialized 
countries, such as spain, Finland, and norway, 
that have adopted inflation targeting more 
recently.
10 This is an important but controversial result. 
Many of the noninflation-targeting countries, 
such as the united states, placed greater 
emphasis on controlling inflation during the 
1990s, and a number of european countries 
aligned their monetary policy with Germany’s. 
although Germany does not meet the strict 
definition of inflation targeting, it is widely 
recognized that inflation has always been a key 
concern of the bundesbank. accurately gaug-
ing the effects of inflation targeting requires 
significant independent variability across infla-
tion-targeting countries. It is likely that we have 
insufficient data for making a sharp distinction 
between a simple regression toward the mean 
and the independent effects that inflation 
targeting has in lowering inflation in this set 
of countries. For a detailed exposition of this 
point, see Mark Gertler’s discussion of the ball 
and sheridan paper.
11 The work of Marco Vega and Diego Win-
kelried uses econometric techniques from the 
treatment literature as well as a wide sample of 
noninflation-targeting countries, while Truman 
tries to uncover the effects of inflation targeting 
by including a wealth of control variables in his 
analysis.18   Q3  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
12 Johnson used survey measures of inflation. 
For all but the united states, they were taken 
from Consensus Forecasts. For the u.s., he used 
expectations from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, which is conducted by the Federal 
reserve bank of Philadelphia.
of targeted inflation, reduce output. 
examining the same set of countries as 
in this article, Johnson finds that infla-
tion targeting has lowered inflation 
expectations. Thus, adopting inflation 
targeting helped those central banks 
coordinate the public’s expectations of 
inflation with the targeted rate.12
Interestingly, he also finds that up 
until the fifth year of pursuing infla-
tion targets, the effect of inflation tar-
geting on reducing expected inflation 
gets progressively larger with each year 
under the inflation-targeting regime. 
after adhering to inflation targeting 
for five years, the effect gradually dissi-
pates. This result makes sense because 
the credibility of a country’s desire to 
lower inflation would be expected to 
increase over time. The longer a cen-
tral bank sticks to inflation targeting, 
the more confident the public becomes 
that the change in policy is permanent. 
Further, the lowering of expected 
inflation induced by adopting inflation 
targets varies from country to country: 
new Zealand enjoys the largest decline 
and the u.K. the least. It is interest-
ing that new Zealand has the strictest 
inflation contract with the Governor 
of the reserve bank, who is solely re-
sponsible for outcomes and subject to 
dismissal, while at the onset of infla-
tion targeting, the bank of england did 
not have operational independence.
In complementary work that also 
sheds light on the behavior of inflation 
expectations, andrew Levin and his 
co-authors examine the behavior of 
survey expectations of inflation in our 
group of inflation-targeting countries 
and those in a control group consisting 
of the u.s. and Japan and a european 
average composed of Germany, France, 
Italy, and the netherlands. They find 
that expectations of long-run inflation 
(five years and 10 years) are not influ-
enced by current inflation (measured 
by an average of inflation over the 
last three years) in inflation-targeting 
countries, whereas long-run inflation 
expectations respond to changes in 
actual inflation in the control group. 
Thus, inflation expectations seem bet-
ter anchored under inflation targeting.  
some economists prefer measures 
of inflation expectations derived from 
financial market data to those derived 
from surveys. Investors in bonds face 
serious losses if they misjudge future 
inflation. refet Gurkaynak and col-
leagues at the Federal reserve board 
carried out research using an alterna-
tive measure of inflation expectations. 
They looked at the difference in yields 
between long-term government bonds 
and long-term government bonds in-
dexed for inflation. The difference in 
yields gives a market expectation of 
inflation. 
They tested to see how sensi-
tive long-run expected inflation is to 
unexpected economic developments, 
which are measured as the difference 
between actual reports of various eco-
nomic statistics and survey forecasts 
of those statistics a few days before 
their release. If investors are confident 
that the central bank will adhere to its 
inflation objectives, the fluctuations 
in current economic data should not 
influence investors’ beliefs about long-
run inflation. however, if investors 
believe that the monetary authority is 
not committed to controlling long-run 
inflation, economic disturbances that 
increase inflation in the near term may 
not be offset in the future. In that case, 
current economic surprises could affect 
expectations of long-run inflation.
unfortunately, there are only 
three countries for which this type of 
experiment can be carried out: the 
u.s., the u.K., and sweden. based on 
data from 1999-2005, when all three 
countries’ inflation rates had fairly well 
stabilized, only in the u.s. are expecta-
tions of long-run inflation sensitive to 
unexpected economic news. Thus, in-
flation expectations appear to be bet-
ter anchored in the u.K. and sweden 
than in the u.s.
an interesting result in their study 
is that before 1997, when the bank of 
england obtained operational indepen-
dence from the government, long-run 
expectations of inflation in the u.K. 
were also sensitive to economic news. 
Whether this result is due to opera-
tional independence providing more 
credibility or the fact that the bank of 
england had established more credibil-
ity over time is an open question.
The Persistence of Inflation. 
one effect of inflation targeting should 
be to reduce the persistence of devia-
tions in inflation from its target be-
cause any deviations of inflation from 
target are gradually offset, whereas 
there is no explicit requirement that a 
noninflation-targeting central bank do 
so. This potential benefit of inflation 
targeting finds support in a couple of 
studies.13 however, the extent to which 
persistence is diminished varies across 
the two studies. one indicates that 
Some economists prefer measures of inflation 
expectations derived from financial market 
data to those derived from surveys.
13 The relevant papers are the ones by Vega and 
Winkelried and Levin and co-authors.   Business Review  Q3  2006   19 www.philadelphiafed.org
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the effect of inflation targeting is quite 
large, while the other finds it to be 
rather small. The difference in results 
could be attributable to the use of dif-
ferent noninflation-targeting countries 
in the two studies, but more work and 
perhaps better data are needed as well.
Output. While it appears that 
inflation targeting in general has had 
economically beneficial effects on the 
behavior of inflation, it would be dif-
ficult to find political support for infla-
tion targeting if, at the same time, it 
had deleterious effects on output. Tru-
man finds that industrialized inflation-
targeting countries experience both an 
increase in output growth and a reduc-
tion in output volatility relative to the 
experience of noninflation-targeting 
countries. his first analysis finds that 
inflation targeting raises growth and 
lowers the variance of growth rates. 
his second experiment directly tests 
whether the changes in relative growth 
rates over the two samples (pre- and 
post-inflation targeting) between 
inflation-targeting and noninflation-
targeting countries are significantly 
different. he finds that the increase 
in growth in inflation-targeting coun-
tries was significantly higher than the 
increase in growth in noninflation-
targeting countries. similarly, he finds 
that the decrease in the volatility of 
output growth was significantly greater 
for the inflation-targeting countries.
CONCLUSIONS
a number of countries have 
implemented inflation targeting, and 
it has been in effect in a few of these 
countries for more than 10 years. The 
exact nature of the inflation-targeting 
framework differs across countries, and 
in most countries, it has evolved over 
time. as expressed in their testimony 
and speeches, monetary policymakers 
in the five inflation-targeting countries 
examined in this article all seem to 
be pleased with the results and have 
found the framework flexible enough 
to allow consideration of economic 
performance. There is no indication 
that inflation targeting has diminished 
economic performance in countries 
that have adopted it relative to the 
performance of other industrialized 
countries. Indeed, there is some evi-
dence that inflation targeting has been 
associated with a reduction in infla-
tion and that expectations of inflation 
are more stable in countries that have 
adopted inflation targeting. Further, 
inflation targeting appears to be com-
patible with robust economic activity.
While the empirical evidence 
on the effects of inflation targeting is 
encouraging, we must acknowledge 
that the data that lend themselves to 
this optimistic view are limited. The 
experiment of inflation targeting has 
proceeded for a fairly short time, and 
thus, it has probably not been subject 
to all the vagaries that economies can 
experience. however, the testimony of 
central bankers who have been respon-
sible for guiding monetary policy in the 
five inflation-targeting countries has 
been overwhelmingly positive.14 Many 
cannot envision departing from their 
current practices and returning to re-
gimes that were less explicit about un-
derlying inflation goals. They point to 
numerous instances where having an 
inflation target both focused monetary 
policy and made it easier to conduct.
14 examples of the enthusiasm that inflation-
targeting central banks have for inflation tar-
geting can be found in several places: see the 
comments pertaining to the Canadian experi-
ence by the Governor of the bank of Canada, 
Gordon Thiessen, and those describing the 
australian experience by the Governor of the 
australian reserve bank, Ian J. Macfarlane. 
also, a favorable opinion of inflation targeting 
can be found in a speech by the Governor of the 
reserve bank of new Zealand, Donald brash, 
delivered at the aea meetings in 2002. Mervyn 
King, the Governor of the bank of england, has 
also eloquently discussed the benefits of infla-
tion targeting. For comments by members of the 
riksbank, who have viewed their experience 
with inflation targeting favorably, see the article 
by Claes berg.    REFERENCES
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